Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the 
provision of public goods

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang

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Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

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Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Max Planck Society;

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Konrad, K. A., & Leininger, W. (2011). Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods. Public choice, 146(3-4), 501-520.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0011-3DB7-4

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