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Unfair and anomalous evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating payoffs

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Stollmeier,  Frank
Max Planck Research Group Network Dynamics, Max Planck Institute for Dynamics and Self-Organization, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Stollmeier, F., & Nagler, J. (2018). Unfair and anomalous evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating payoffs. Physical Review Letters, 120(5): 058101. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.120.058101.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0000-8300-B
Abstract
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be "unfair," meaning that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the prisoner's dilemma, and an unexpected selection reversal in the hawk-dove game.