Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information

Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; Nicolò, Antonio

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Journal Article

Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information

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Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008
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Eguia, J. X., Llorente-Saguer, A., Morton, R., & Nicolò, A. (2018). Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information. Games and Economic Behavior.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0000-7FAE-F

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