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Grammar and social agency:
The pragmatics of impersonal deontic statements

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Sentence and construction types generally have more than one pragmatic function. Impersonal deontic declaratives such as 'it is necessary to X' assert the existence of an obligation or necessity without tying it to any particular individual. This family of statements can accomplish a range of functions, including getting another person to act, explaining or justifying the speaker's own behavior as he or she undertakes to do something, or even justifying the speaker's behavior while simultaneously getting another person to help. How is an impersonal deontic declarative fit for these different functions? And how do people know which function it has in a given context? We address these questions using video recordings of everyday interactions among speakers of Italian and Polish. Our analysis results in two findings. The first is that the pragmatics of impersonal deontic declaratives is systematically shaped by (i) the relative responsibility of participants for the necessary task and (ii) the speaker's nonverbal conduct at the time of the statement. These two factors influence whether the task in question will be dealt with by another person or by the speaker, often giving the statement the force of a request or, alternatively, of an account of the speaker's behavior. The second finding is that, although these factors systematically influence their function, impersonal deontic declaratives maintain the potential to generate more complex interactions that go beyond a simple opposition between requests and accounts, where participation in the necessary task may be shared, negotiated, or avoided. This versatility of impersonal deontic declaratives derives from their grammatical makeup: by being deontic and impersonal, they can both mobilize or legitimize an act by different participants in the speech event, while their declarative form does not constrain how they should be responded to. These features make impersonal deontic declaratives a special tool for the management of social agency.*

Keywords: impersonal, deontic, declarative, pragmatics, grammar, agency, social interaction

1. INTRODUCTION. Sentence types and constructions generally have more than one pragmatic function (Bolinger 1957, 1967, Sadock & Zwicky 1985, Heritage 2012, Couper-Kuhlen 2014). A declarative construction like *It's late*, for example, can be used for a wide range of purposes, including informing, complaining, requesting, and more. For the analysis of any multifunctional form, there are two central questions: How is the form fit for its different functions? And how do people know which function the form has in a given context?

Explaining how linguistic structures are designed and understood to deliver different social actions is a long-standing challenge for pragmatics (see Levinson 2013 for a review). Some scholars emphasize the role played by the linguistic signal itself, with its fine morphosyntactic details and prosodic realization. But this is often not enough. Other factors are usually called upon that are external to the linguistic signal and rather

belong to the context. The notion of CONTEXT is notoriously complex. For one thing, it involves the social roles and statuses of people—a question like *Can we put the dust bin over there?*, for instance, may function as a request for help if directed to a subordinate person, or as a request for permission if directed to a superior (Ervin-Tripp 1976:47–48; see Sinclair & Coulthard 1975:33). At the same time, context also involves the sequential development of the actions prior to a certain utterance—in primary-care visits, for instance, the physician's question *How are you?* is understood differently by patients depending on whether it is asked before or after the visit's preparatory tasks (Robinson 2013:264).

Another element of context that has long been recognized in pragmatics is the speaker's nonverbal behavior. Research on co-speech gesture (see Goldin-Meadow 2014 for a recent review) shows the importance of hand gestures for a number of interpretive tasks, from disambiguating deictic words, to reference tracking, to parsing discourse structure. Most of these studies, however, are based on elicited narratives and do not focus on specific sentence or construction types. At the same time, research in conversation analysis and related fields has examined the pragmatic functions of nonverbal conduct across different activities in naturally occurring interaction. Manual gesture, gaze, and other forms of visible action play a role in various conversational processes, including turn construction (e.g. Goodwin 1981, Hayashi 2005, Ford et al. 2012), turn-taking (e.g. Mondada 2007, Holler & Kendrick 2015), and sequence organization (e.g. Rossano 2012, Floyd et al. 2014). But again, little of this research has sought to explain how specific nonverbal behaviors systematically influence the pragmatics of specific sentence or construction types. One notable exception is an experimental study by Kelly and colleagues (1999), based on people's responses to videos of scripted interactions. The target sentence type was descriptions like *I'm getting cold* or *The flies are out*, which may or may not be interpreted as requests (e.g. to close the window). The finding is that the speaker's pointing to a relevant object (e.g. an open window) helps the interpretation of the ambiguous statements as requests. Although limited by the artificial nature of the interactions, this finding points to a promising line of inquiry into the systematic association of certain linguistic forms with specific nonverbal behaviors.

The present study furthers this line by focusing on impersonal deontic declaratives like 'It is necessary to X'. By this we refer to a family of constructions that are used in different languages to express the obligation or necessity to carry out an action without specifying who the obligation refers to or who should fulfill it (Benincà & Poletto 1994, Hansen 2001, Berman 2011, Yan & Siewierska 2011, Zinken & Ogiermann 2011). We use conversational data from speakers of Italian and Polish, one of our goals being to show that impersonal deontic constructions are used similarly across languages. Studying these constructions in naturally occurring interaction allows us not only to maintain ecological validity but also to shed light on the social processes involved in their use and in the nonverbal behavior that accompanies them.

It has been argued that, when Polish speakers use the construction *trzeba X* 'it is necessary to X', they are neither asking nor telling somebody to do something but simply MENTIONING a necessary action, thus giving others the opportunity to 'assume responsibility and actively involve themselves in accomplishing that action' (Zinken & Ogiermann 2011:270–71). But impersonal deontic declaratives are not just a strategy for getting others to act. By saying 'it is necessary to X', speakers may also explain or justify their own behavior as they undertake to do something, or even justify their own behavior while simultaneously getting another person to help. The goal of this study is

therefore to explain how this form can function as a REQUEST in some cases, as an AC-COUNT in others, or as both or neither of these.

At the core of this versatility is the grammatical makeup of impersonal deontic declaratives. By being deontic and impersonal—that is, by not specifying the bearer of the obligation or necessity—they have the potential to both mobilize or legitimize an act by different participants in the speech event, while their declarative form does not constrain how they should be responded to. At the same time, their pragmatics is systematically shaped by two factors: (i) the relative responsibility of participants for the task in question, and (ii) the presence of particular nonverbal features accompanying the speaker's utterance. In §4.2, we show that:

- when the responsibility to deal with a necessary task clearly falls on a specific person before the impersonal deontic declarative is produced, this person is designated as the agent;
- when, however, the responsibility cannot be readily determined, the designation of the agent becomes contingent upon other interactional elements, most importantly the speaker's nonverbal conduct while uttering the statement.
  - On the one hand, speaker gaze at a coparticipant regularly prompts this coparticipant to deal with the necessary task, giving the statement the force of a request;
  - on the other hand, the incipient engagement of the speaker in doing the task promotes the speaker's lone involvement in it, as it is likely to obviate the need for other coparticipants to see to it. This gives the statement the force of an account of the speaker's own behavior.

But the pragmatics of impersonal deontic declaratives cannot be reduced to an opposition between two actions—requests versus accounts. In §5, we show that the use of this form can give rise to more complex interactions, including ones in which the import of the statement cannot be categorized as either a request or an account, others in which the designation of the agent becomes a matter of negotiation, and still others in which the statement simply goes unresponded to. These findings are particularly relevant in relation to prior research on other forms of requesting—especially imperatives and interrogatives—that do not exhibit the same range of interactional possibilities. Imperatives and interrogatives constrain the response space to one or two alternatives, the production of which is normatively expected (Craven & Potter 2010, Rossi 2012, 2015, Zinken & Ogiermann 2013; see also Raymond 2003). In contrast to this, the analysis of complex interactions involving impersonal deontic declaratives invites us to consider how they afford an open response space.

This study furthers our understanding of language as both a system and a tool for interaction, and it adds to our knowledge of the interface between language and the body. In exploring the relation between the formal and functional properties of impersonal deontic declaratives, it indicates the management of social agency as an important purpose of grammatical structure.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY.
2.1. DATA. We present data from both Italian and Polish on the basis of the strong similarities we find between the two languages, not only in the forms that impersonal deontic declaratives take but also in the usage properties that they have. The analysis of both languages is not, strictly speaking, comparative, but intended as providing converging evidence on the pragmatic properties of impersonal deontic declaratives. The extent to which these properties are shared among other languages will need to be verified by future research.

The present study is based on video recordings of naturally occurring interaction. The Italian collection contains eighty-one impersonal deontic declaratives exhaustively drawn from twenty-five hours of interaction between family members or close friends living in northern regions of Italy. This corpus includes forty-five recordings featuring more than 140 different participants. The Polish collection contains fifty-three impersonal deontic declaratives exhaustively drawn from thirteen hours of interaction in families living in Lublin (south-east Poland) and Warsaw. This corpus includes twenty-seven recordings featuring about forty different participants. Both the Italian and the Polish data involve not only casual conversation but also everyday activities such as cooking, having meals, and playing games.

We collected impersonal deontic declaratives on the basis of lexico-grammatical criteria that are laid out in §3. The collection was further restricted on the basis of the constructional status of the statement in the speaker's conversational turn. The focal cases are ones in which the statement is built as the main turn-constructional unit of the turn (Sacks et al. 1974:702–4). In grammatical terms, these are cases in which the statement is the only clause in the turn (e.g. 'Oh, it is necessary to open the window, John') or the clause around which other clausal elements are syntactically organized (e.g. 'It is necessary to open the window, I think, because it's getting too hot in here'). Cases in which the statement is subordinated to another clause (e.g. 'We should get started, because it is necessary to finish the job by tonight') are excluded. The full list of the impersonal deontic declarative cases and their translations is given in the online appendix.[1]

2.2. Qualitative and quantitative analysis. Our arguments are based on a qualitative analysis of each impersonal deontic declarative collected relative to the interactional context in which it occurs, including the material environment as well as the sequential development of actions and talk that precede and follow the statement. We examine the formal properties of impersonal deontic declaratives together with relevant aspects of the participants' visible behavior, and we try to establish functional relations between their use and the way in which the interaction unfolds.

We also offer a quantitative analysis of features of the nonverbal behavior of participants in relation to the outcome of the interaction surrounding an impersonal deontic declarative—that is, in relation to who, among the participants, ends up carrying out the necessary task. Such an analysis is based on a systematic coding of all cases by means of the following set of questions, where A refers to the participant producing the statement (also referred to as the *speaker*) and B refers to their coparticipant(s).

   (i) Does B end up doing X?
  (ii) Does B refuse to do X?
 (iii) Does A end up doing X?
 (iv) Does A gaze at B when producing the statement?
  (v) Is A visibly moving to do X when producing the statement?

Questions (i) and (ii) were answered with 'yes' when at least one coparticipant, but not necessarily all, dealt with the relevance of their involvement in the necessary task, by either taking it on or refusing to do so. Question (iii) was answered positively when the speaker of the statement undertook the task. For question (iv), we considered A's gaze at B at any point during the production of the statement or of an increment thereof (Ford et al. 2002, Couper-Kuhlen & Ono 2007). The target of A's gaze was mostly a single coparticipant, but sometimes a group of individuals. Finally, question (v) was answered

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[1] Available at http://muse.jhu.edu/article/637153/pdf.

with 'yes' when A's visible bodily actions were preliminary to the accomplishment of the necessary task (see the examples in 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17).

3. Lexico-grammatical construction of impersonal deontic declaratives. By impersonal deontic declaratives we refer to a family of constructions that share two lexico-grammatical features. First, they are semantically modal; that is, they express the obligatoriness or necessity of an event, as do English verbs such as *must* and *need* or constructions like *the door is to be kept shut* (see Lyons 1977:Ch. 17, Bybee et al. 1994:Ch. 6, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998, Palmer 2001). Second, they leave unspecified both who the obligation refers to and who ought to carry out the necessary act. Impersonal deontic declaratives have been discussed in various contexts by linguists of Italian (e.g. Benincà & Poletto 1994) and Polish (e.g. Hansen 2001). And typological work has documented their presence across diverse languages, such as Hebrew (Berman 2011) and Mandarin (Yan & Siewierska 2011).

In this study, the term *impersonal* should be understood broadly as referring to any construction that does not make semantic reference to any person as the bearer of the stated obligation or necessity. In languages like Italian and Polish, one first type of such constructions—the most common in our data—is built with a deontic modal followed by an infinitival complement. Italian *bisogna* and Polish *trzeba* are verbs without a referential subject that express a state of necessity ('it is necessary to') specified in the infinitive clause that follows them. While *bisogna* takes a nonreferential third-person singular inflection (-*a*), *trzeba* is uninflected (grammars of Polish refer to it as an 'improper' or 'defective' verb).[2]

(1) bisogna   aggiungere più   parmigiano   (Italian)
    necessitate.3sg add.inf   more Parmesan
      'it is necessary to add more Parmesan'

(2) trzeba   otworzyć okno   (Polish)
    necessitate open.inf window
      'it is necessary to open the window'

Another way of expressing an obligation without tying it to any particular individual is by intransitive constructions with nonhuman subjects, as in the English *The rubbish has to be thrown out*.

(3) ci   vuole   un mestolo   (Italian)
    exst want.3sg one ladle
      'there must be a ladle/a ladle is needed'

(4) c'è   il pane da tagliare   (Italian)
    exst=be.3sg the bread to cut.inf
      'the bread is to be cut'

In this study, we refer to all of these construction types as impersonal for the sake of simplicity (cf. Siewierska 2008). In terms of modality, the obligation or necessity expressed by these forms can be interpreted as relative to social, ethical norms, or as determined by natural, environmental causes (see Nuyts 2006:1–8, Kratzer 2012:4–9). For our purposes, what matters is that both kinds of conditioning factors are external to the partici-

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[2] Abbreviations used in glosses are as follows, with shorter versions used where necessary for space: a(cc): accusative, aug: augmentative, cmp: complementizer, cmpr: comparative, cnd: conditional, con: connective, dat: dative, dim: diminutive, exst: existential marker, fut: future, gen: genitive, imp: imperative, inf: infinitive, ipf: imperfect, itj: interjection, n(om): nominative, npst: nonpast, pcl: particle, pfv: perfective, pl: plural, pstp: past participle, rfl: reflexive, scl: subject clitic, sg: singular.

pants involved—the statements can therefore be referred to as *deontic* (Palmer 2001:6). Their use in the present data does not call for a pragmatic distinction between different modal meanings.

Statements that leave the agent (or experiencer, or theme) of what is said unspecified are inherently context-dependent (Condoravdi & Gawron 1996). There is a lively debate in formal semantics about how such sentences nevertheless come to be understood as true or false in relation to particular individuals. One solution is to posit the presence of an implicit argument—in our case, the bearer of the obligation or necessity—that is syntactically unexpressed, but whose role must be conceptually filled to arrive at a proposition (Roeper 1987, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006; see also Williams 1985). Another solution is to treat the content of such statements as invariable, but their truth values as relativized to individuals, thus allowing context to enter more deeply into the semantic analysis, to put it simply; see, for example, Lasersohn 2005, 2007 on predicates of personal taste, such as *Roller coasters are fun*. Although we cannot engage with this literature in depth here, we should point out that the analysis we present in §5 suggests that a designated agent is not always implicitly present in the formulation of impersonal deontic declaratives. In the next section, we begin to examine how people in interaction determine who will tend to the stated need, which has consequences for what social action the statement accomplishes.

4. IMPERSONAL DEONTIC DECLARATIVES AS ONE OF TWO ACTIONS.

4.1. REQUESTS VERSUS ACCOUNTS. Impersonal deontic declaratives often appear to realize one of two social actions: either a REQUEST for someone to do something, or else an ACCOUNT of the speaker's doing that something. We begin the analysis by illustrating these two distinct actions and the way in which impersonal deontic declaratives come to implement them.

In terms of sequence organization, a request is the first pair part of an adjacency pair that projects a second pair part with one of two outcomes: the fulfillment of the request or a rejection of it (Schegloff 2007:59). A request makes the occurrence of one of these next moves conditionally relevant, which means that any other next move, including not responding, becomes accountable and sanctionable (Schegloff 1968, Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Crucially, fulfillment of or refusal to fulfill the request are actions to be produced by the recipient of the request: a person different from the speaker.

The fragment in 5 shows a case in which an impersonal deontic declarative has the force of a request. People are working in the kitchen of a holiday camp. Eliana addresses Linda and obtains her attention (lines 1–4), at which point she tells her that 'the next tray is to be put in [the dishwasher]'. Linda then takes the tray and proceeds to load it.

(5) CampGioLava_1368792 (Italian)

1 Eliana	Linda				
	NAME				
	'Linda'				
2	(.)				
3 Eliana	donna	delle	dei	piatti	
	woman	of.the	of.the	plates	
	'dishes woman'				
4	(1.1)/((Linda turns to Eliana and smiles))				

5 Eliana	ehm la nuova ringhiera è da metter dentro ((points to tray))	
	uhm the new railing be.3SG to put.INF inside	
	'uhm the next tray is to be put in'	

6 Linda   ((takes dishwasher tray from Pamela))

The structure of this interaction is analogous to a request sequence. A first action (the target statement) is paired with a relevant next action (the fulfillment of the need) produced in response to it. The impersonal deontic declarative here has a similar effect to an imperative or interrogative form of requesting (e.g. 'put in the next tray' or 'can you put in the next tray?'). But why does Eliana use this form? One reason seems to be that Linda is not the only person involved in the task. The request here is not a simple one-to-one transaction. Another person (Pamela) has just removed the tray from where it has been unloaded and, together with others, will help Linda reload it with dirty dishes. Although Linda is the main person assigned to taking the tray in and out of the dishwasher—the 'dishes woman' (line 3)—other people are implicated in making this happen. The statement mobilizes Linda to start the process without restricting participation in it to her alone, but rather presenting it as a collective affair.

Let us now consider a case in which an impersonal deontic declarative plays out as an account. An account can be broadly defined as the provision of a rationale for a stretch of the speaker's behavior (Garfinkel 1967, Heritage 1984:Ch. 6, Antaki 1994, Parry 2009). Upon leaving a conversation, for instance, somebody may say *I need to use the bathroom* (Goodwin 1987). Accounts can be produced both as remedial actions to untoward behavior (Scott & Lyman 1968) and in reference to regular conduct, for example, to 'make it plain' (Antaki 1994:2) or to 'validate and promote a current agenda' (Waring 2007:367). In sequence organization, accounts can be made relevant after a complaint (Drew 1998) or explicitly requested through a question: *Why did you do that?* (Bolden & Robinson 2011). But they can also be provided without having been solicited, as in the case of impersonal deontic declaratives.

In the fragment in 6, two young girls are painting Easter eggs. The mother of one of them, Jolanta, has organized this activity and is supervising it. At line 1, Jolanta takes a finished egg from Pola and offers her a new one for painting, putting it into an egg cup. When Pola picks up the egg, however, she finds that it is already stained ('oh no'; line 6). Jolanta then realizes that this is due to the egg cup being dirty (lines 7–9) and announces that 'it is necessary to wash it clean first'.

(6) Pauly 7/4/2012 13:15 (Polish)
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    1 Jolanta  chcesz    nowe¿ teraz?
              want.2SG  new    now
                 'You want a new one now?'
    2 Pola     ((nods))
    3 Jolanta  dobra to    to  się będzie    ((reaches for new egg))
              good  then  this RFL will.3SG
                 'okay then this will'
    4          (  )
    5          ((Jolanta places new egg in cup and moves it to Pola))
    6 Pola     o nie:: ((raises egg up))
                 'oh no'
    7 Jolanta  oj  chyba     (  ) ten¿ ((grabs egg))
              oh  probably  (  ) this
                 'oh probably (  ) this?'
    8          (.)
    9 Jolanta  a  nie:: bo      m(h).tsk bo      to   jest brudne
              ah no    because m(h).tsk because this is   dirty
                 'ah no because, tsk, because this is dirty'
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10	>czyli trzeba ((puts egg down))
	  that.means necessitate
	   'that means it is necessary'

11	najpierw< odmyć, o::j czekaj czekaj ((picks up egg cup)) first wash.off.INF oh.dear wait wait 'to first wash it clean, oh dear wait wait'

12   (1.6)/((Jolanta walks away from table))
13 Jolanta   weźmiemy do tego:¿   ((walks to sink))
              take.1PL   to this.GEN
                 'we take it over here'

While saying 'it is necessary to wash it clean first', Jolanta puts the new egg down on the table and picks up the offending egg cup to take it to the sink. The temporal overlap between Jolanta's words and actions characterizes her statement as an account of what she is doing. Unlike in example 5, the statement does not project the accomplishment of the necessary task by another person, and no response comes from Pola or the other coparticipants.

Jolanta also could have formulated an account of her behavior with a first-person form like 'I need to wash this clean first'. But this would not reflect the configuration in which the necessary task becomes relevant. Jolanta is not going to wash the cup for a personal reason, but in response to a problem raised by Pola a moment earlier. Moreover, a clean egg cup is necessary more generally for all eggs and all painters—not just for Pola, Jolanta, and the new egg that has just been placed there.

4.2. How do people know how to respond? We have seen that impersonal deontic declaratives sometimes work as a request and sometimes as an account. But how do recipients know which any given one is, and thus how to respond? How do they understand who is to carry out the necessary task if the statement itself does not specify it?

Responsibility. One factor is that the task may clearly fall within someone's responsibility. In everyday interaction, responsibilities often derive from the distribution of labor and roles in joint activities. In the fragment in 5, Linda is in charge of taking trays in and out of the dishwasher—she is the 'dishes woman' (line 3). Within this domain, her obligation to act is higher than for the others, until the activity is over. Similarly, in the fragment in 6, Jolanta is the adult in charge of managing the children's egg painting, which makes her responsible to ensure that the relevant tools are in working order.

At other times, an asymmetry in the relative responsibility of people for an action emerges more contingently. Someone can be more responsible for an action at a given moment because it becomes relevant as part of a course of action in which they are already engaged, or because they are manipulating tools or objects implicated in the action. Consider the next two cases.

In the fragment in 7, three-year-old Kasia has climbed onto a chair at the kitchen table to drink some tea, but at line 1 she laments that the tea is 'hot'. Mom's response contains the statement 'it is necessary to blow', which Kasia then proceeds to do (line 6). Note that Mom's second turn-constructional unit at line 3 ('show me') as well as Kasia's verbal response at line 5 ('leave it now') are part of an unrelated concurrent activity.

(7) PP4-2 13:00 (Polish)
     1 Kasia   (i-) gorące ((drops spoon and leans back))
                    '(i-) hot'
     2   (.)

> 3 Mom no trzeba   dmuchać pokaż
>   PCL necessitate blow.INF show.IMP
>   'well yes it is necessary to blow {on it}, show (me)'

4   (0.6)/((Mom picks something out of Kasia's hair))
5 Kasia już   nie
           already not
              'leave it now'
6   ((Kasia blows on the tea))

While uttering line 1, Kasia drops the spoon into the tea mug and leans back on her chair. These elements of Kasia's conduct characterize her assessment of the tea as 'hot' as the formulation of a problem. Mom's impersonal deontic declarative is built as a response to this: she begins her turn with the particle *no* 'well yes', an item that, in turn-initial position, indexes the obviousness of the information provided in the preceding turn (Weidner 2012:Ch. 3). The statement so designed has a socializing function in that it instructs Kasia on what everyone should do in the situation she has just encountered.

Here, the recipient does not have any general responsibility for cooling tea. What makes it clear that she should be the one blowing on it is that it is HER tea, and that she is currently holding the cup with her hands.

In another case, given in 8, people are doing washing and cleaning up after lunch. Leo has just brought a tray into the kitchen with some leftovers. He first offers the leftovers to the others (1–3) and then, following a proposal by Sandra (lines 4–10), sets out to throw the leftovers away. But as he looks to the rubbish bin (around line 12), he slows down, appearing to notice that the bag is full, and glances around to locate a free spot where he can rest the tray (line 14). At that point, he produces an impersonal deontic declarative while placing the tray on the worktop (line 15), after which he walks off to the kitchen pantry, where the new rubbish bags are kept.

(8) CampUniLava_521433 (Italian)
     1 Leo   pezzo di panettone ((to Gigi, off-camera))
                piece of panettone
                   '{want a} piece of panettone?'
     2 Gigi   ([ ) ((off-camera, probably declines offer))
     3 Leo   [after
                    'later'
     4 Sandra   [sono   fuori da   due giorni comunque eh ((to Leo))
                  be.3PL out from two days   anyway   PCL
                   'they've been out for two days actually'
     5   secondo me   si   possono anche b[uttar   vi]a
                following 1SG.A RFL can.3PL also   throw.INF away
                   'I think we can also throw them away'
     6 Leo   [anda   ]
                                                   PCL
                                                    'off they go?'
     7 Sandra ((nods))
     8   (0.8)
     9 Sandra cè son   rimasti   proprio fuori senz[a::
                PCL be.3PL remain.PSTP really   out   without
                   'I mean they've been simply out without any::'
     10 Leo   [(vabom)
                                                          (PCL)
                                                           '(alright)'

11		((picks up leftovers and moves to rubbish bin))
12 Gioia	beh al massimo sono un po' (s[ecchi)	
	PCL at maximum be.3PL one bit (dry)	
	'well at worst they're a bit (dry)'	
13 Leo		[(e)::: ((slows down))
		(and)
		'(uhm):::'
14	(0.3)/((Leo glances around))	

15 Leo	'petta bisogna prendere i:: °sacchetti° ((puts tray down))
	wait.IMP.2SG necessitate.3SG take.INF the sacks.DIM
	'wait it is necessary to get the:: °bags°'

16	((walks to pantry to get rubbish bags))

As Leo says 'it is necessary to get the bags', he undertakes to perform the necessary action himself. The statement here functions as an account of his behavior, providing a rationale for what might otherwise be interpreted as abandoning what he has just set out to do (cf. Garfinkel 1967:Ch. 2, Goffman 1967:Ch. 4). Leo could also achieve this by saying 'I need to get the bags'. Such a form, however, would frame the action as his individual business, dissociating it from the larger collaborative activity. Leo is throwing out the leftovers by virtue of a joint decision with others in lines 4–10, which motivates framing what he is doing as a collective pursuit.

But how do Leo's coparticipants know that they are not being asked to help? The strongest cue here seems to be that getting new rubbish bags becomes necessary as part of a course of action Leo is already engaged in. Having taken it upon himself to throw out the leftovers, Leo is in a position to see to other actions that may be required along the way. Another cue is that, unlike in fragments in 5 and 7, the impersonal deontic declarative is not ADDRESSED to anyone. Leo does not gaze at any of his coparticipants, and he produces the end part of the statement with low voice ('°bags°').

SPEAKER'S NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR. In all cases examined so far, the interpretation of an impersonal deontic declarative is informed by the context in which it occurs. The matter of who is to carry out the necessary task—and therefore of whether the statement is functioning as a request or as an account—is readily sorted out on the basis of people's relative responsibilities for it. Such a contextual determiner, however, is not always available. Consider the interaction leading up to the statement in the following two cases.

In the fragment in 9, Magda and her friends, members of a vocal ensemble, are hanging out after their weekly rehearsal. While they are drinking and eating snacks, Magda reads out a tax form about the vocal ensemble, and a consultation takes place about how questions should be answered. Up to this point, however, no record has been kept of the decisions made.

(9) DopoProve09-1_1183900 (Italian)	
1 Magda	e in più: il discorso de:i degli amministratori
	and in more the discourse of.the of.the administrators
	'and then also the matter of the managers'
2	del codice fiscale dello stato dove sono assunti
	of.the code fiscal of.the status where be.3PL employed
	'of the social security number, of the status they get'
3	(3.0)

4 Magda	bisom³	tor	na	mati:ta °così da veder 'n atimo se::°
	necessitate.3SG	take.INF	one pencil	so to see.INF one instant if
	'it is necessary to get a pencil °to see a moment whether°'			

5	(2.0)
6 Magda	la prima volta che ( )
	the first time CMP
	'the first time that ( )'
7	[((mumbles))

8 Pietro	[beh secondo me [to' guarda una matita qua c'è ((leans))
	PCL following 1SG.A ITJ look.IMP.2SG one pencil here EXST=be.3SG
	'well I think- here you are, look, here is a pencil'

9 Bruna	[((reaches for pencil))
10 Magda	[vai
	go.NPST.2SG
	'there we go'
11 Bruna	[((hands pencil to Pietro))

12 Pietro	((hands pencil to Magda))

In lines 1–2, Magda lists a few more points of the tax form that need to be dealt with. After a pause (line 3), during which she raises her head from the form, Magda produces an impersonal deontic declarative about the need of getting a pencil for taking notes of what is being agreed upon.

Our focus here is on the interactional configuration before the statement is produced. A few pencils, which were used for the rehearsal, are scattered on the table, buried under snacks and drinks. Nobody has a pencil now or has just used one. Since Magda is leading the decision process, she is plausibly in a better position to keep notes, but this does not imply that it is easier for her to retrieve a pencil. Throughout lines 1–3, Magda's co-participants have been all sitting about, munching and nibbling on their snacks. Thus, at the time of Magda's impersonal deontic declarative, there is no apparent basis for assigning the responsibility for getting a pencil to any one individual.

A comparable situation can be found in the fragment in 10. The family are having lunch, and at line 1 Ilona initiates talk about the absent daughter, Asia, who is on a school trip ('I wonder what Asia had for lunch today'). She then points out the current time ('aha, it's three already'; line 4), a noticing that adumbrates the relevance of some particular action. After Jacek receives the noticing with a minimal *mhm* and a nod, Ilona goes on to formulate the action that needs to happen: 'then it will really be necessary to call the lady'—the leader of their daughter's school trip—to find out whether they have returned to the city.

(10) PP2-1 30:19 (Polish)

1 Ilona	ho¿ ciekawe co Asia dzisiaj na obiad
	ITJ interesting what NAME today on lunch
	'ha¿ I wonder what Asia had for lunch'
2	jadła °bhh°
	ate bhh
	'today °bhh°'

3		(5.0)/((Ilona drinks, Jacek checks watch, Ilona glances at Jacek's watch))
4	Ilona	o już piętnasta
		PCL already fifteenth
		'aha it's 3 already'
5	Jacek	mhm¿ ((nods))
6	Ilona	m: to trzeba będzie faktycznie zadzwonić do pan
		m: then necessitate will factually call.INF to lady.GEN
		'm: then it will really be necessary to call the lady'
7		(1.0)/((Jacek chews))
9	Jacek	myślę że o wpół wystarczy
		think.1SG that at half suffice.3SG
		'I think at half will be enough'
10		bo [oni najpierw] (.) hm
		because they first hm
		'because they first {go} hm'
11	Ilona	[mhm]
12		(1.0)/((Jacek swallows))
13	Jacek	na Grodzką jadą
		on Grodzka drive
		'to Grodzka Street'

The analysis suggests that, in cases such as 9 and 10, the nonverbal behavior of the speaker during the production of the impersonal deontic declarative can serve as a cue for designating the accomplisher of the necessary task. A key behavior with this functional property is speaker gaze. In the fragment in 9, while producing the statement, Magda noticeably tosses her head toward Pietro and gazes at him. In so doing, she singles him out as a privileged recipient of her statement. After a pause, Magda goes back to reading the tax form (line 6), at which point Pietro responds by registering the presence of a pencil on the table ('here you are, look here is a pencil') and by simultaneously leaning forward to reach it. As Pietro reaches across the table, Bruna locates the pencil, picks it up, and hands it to him (line 11), after which the pencil finally arrives in Magda's hands. Similarly, in the fragment in 10, Ilona remains seated and directs her gaze at Jacek. He then responds by disputing the need to call the lady at that moment, and thus orients to the relevance of his dealing with the task.

It is well established that gaze behavior combines with speech in accomplishing different kinds of interactional work (e.g. Kendon 1967, Goodwin 1979, 1980, 1981; see Rossano 2013:Ch. 1 for a review). For example, gaze is one of the methods that speakers use to address utterances to coparticipants in multiparty interaction (Lerner 2003). When asking questions, questioners look at recipients in the majority of cases (Rossano et al. 2009; cf. Kendon 1967), and the presence of the questioner's gaze correlates with faster responses (Stivers et al. 2009). More in general, several studies show that a central function of gaze is to solicit or pursue response by others (Kendon 1967, Bavelas et al. 2002, Kidwell 2009, Stivers & Rossano 2010, Rossano 2012:Ch. 3). In examples 9 and 10, Magda's and Ilona's gazes while producing the target statements appear to have just such a function. The declarative and impersonal form of a statement like 'it is necessary to X' does not inherently mandate a response by any particular recipient. While there are cases like 5 and 7 where the context already makes it clear who should take on the necessary task, in cases like 9 and 10 this is not obvious. Here, speaker gaze can

serve to increase response pressure on a narrower subset of the audience (Stivers &
Rossano 2010), thereby inviting them to deal with the relevance of the stated necessity.

Speakers of impersonal deontic declaratives also often gaze at the addressee when
the addressee is already understood to be responsible for the task in question, as it hap-
pens in both examples 5 and 7. This strengthens the association of gaze with mobilizing
others to act. However, while in 5 and 7 gaze comes on top of a contextual specification
of responsibility, in 9 and 10 it becomes a focal element of interpretation. Note also that
gaze normally goes together with another aspect of the speaker's behavior while pro-
ducing the statement, namely a relatively stationary bodily configuration, or better, a
visible nonengagement in the necessary task. The relevance of this becomes clear as we
compare cases in which the statement functions as an account.[4]

Having discussed how speakers can design an impersonal deontic declarative so as to
mobilize another person to act, we now consider how they can also, in contrast, pro-
mote their lone involvement in carrying the task out. The analysis indicates that this is
systematically achieved through another kind of nonverbal behavior at the time at
which the statement is produced: the incipient practical engagement of the speaker in
the task at hand. We consider speakers to be PROJECTABLY ENGAGED IN DOING X when
their bodily actions at the time at which the statement is produced are preparatory to the
accomplishment of X. This is illustrated in the following two cases.

The fragment in 11 takes place in a kitchen. Ada, Furio, and Eva are searching around
for 'big bowls'.

> (11) Camillo_188722
>
> 1 Furio   beh uh:: qua non sono   nessune grandone heh
>   PCL uh   here not be.3PL none   big.AUG PCL
>   'well uh:: here there's no big ones heh'
>
> 2   (0.3)
>
> 3 Ada   bison   chiedere alla   Milena= ((opens another cupboard))
>   necessitate.3SG ask.INF at.the NAME
>   'it is necessary to ask Milena'
>
> 4 Eva   =ma dai che [quella lì   va   bene ( )
>   but PCL CON that   there go.3SG well
>   'come on this one is all right ( )'
>
> 5 Ada   [sì che le   avete   sempre avute   le
>   yes CMP 3PL.A have.2PL always have.PSTP the
>   ciotolone
>   bowls.AUG
>   'but you guys have always had big bowls'
>
> 6   ve[ro che le   hanno   sempre avu]te   le ciotol[one da
>   true CMP 3PL.A have.2PL always have.PSTP the bowls.AUG to
>   'isn't it true that they've always had big bowls for'
>
> ┌───┐
> │ 7 Furio   [però secondo   me   ]   [bisogna   │
> │   but   following 1SG.ACC   necessitate.3SG │
> │   'but I think   it is necessary to' │
> │   │
> │ 8   andare a cercare   [nell'armadio fuori   ((opens kitchen door)) │
> │   go.INF to search.INF in.the=closet outside   │
> │   'go and look in the closet outside'   │
> └───┘

[4] If the purpose of the speaker's gaze is to mobilize another person to act, it is clear why it often goes to-
gether with a relatively stationary bodily configuration. But the meaning of this aspect of the speaker's be-
havior is also independent of its correlation with gaze, as it stands in opposition or ANTITHESIS to engaging in
the necessary task (Darwin 1872:Ch. 2; see also Enfield 2013:132–33).

9 Eva	[secondo te dove saranno ((to Michele))
	following 2SG.A where be.FUT.3PL
	'where do you think they can be?'
10 Ada	ah sì grazie ((to Furio, while moving to kitchen's threshold))
	'oh yes thanks'

At the beginning of the fragment, Furio has opened a cupboard for everyone to look into, and in line 1 he registers that the kinds of 'big bowls' they are after are not in there. After a brief pause, Ada produces an impersonal deontic declarative ('it is necessary to ask Milena') as she opens another cupboard that does not contain any bowls. Eva responds by pointing out that another bowl on the table should do for their purposes (line 4). Her remark is sequentially deleted by Ada (lines 5–6), who insists on the fact that 'big bowls' must be somewhere in the house. In overlap with this, Furio utters the target impersonal deontic declarative, stating that it is necessary to look for the bowls in a closet outside the kitchen. Once again, before the target statement is produced, there is not any clear reason to think that someone in particular should look for the bowls. All participants are equally engaged in the search.

But consider now the speaker's behavior while producing the statement. As he says 'but I think' (line 7), Furio turns to the kitchen door and then moves to open it, thus taking the first steps toward 'going to look in the closet outside'. The relevance of this aspect of the speaker's nonverbal behavior is obviously that, if he can be understood to already be seeing to the necessary task, this will normally obviate the need for other coparticipants to deal with it. In other words, Furio's bodily actions make available his bid to fill in the role of ANIMATOR of the task at hand (Goffman 1981:Ch. 3). Ada's response 'oh yes thanks' in line 10 shows that she has understood him as taking on this role, and orients to this as something Furio is doing to the benefit of a larger group.

In a second case, given in 12, Ewa and her six-year-old son Olek are sitting together at a small table, and Olek is coloring in a drawing. His father Mirek is also present, lying on the adjacent sofa and watching TV. At line 2, Ewa formulates an impersonal deontic declarative: 'oh dear, it is necessary to feed the fish you know' and at the same time starts getting up. She then walks to the fish tank and proceeds to feed the fish.

(12) Ela 2716900 (Polish)

1	((Olek is coloring a picture, Ewa is watching him))
2 Ewa	o:jej rybkę trzeba nakarmić wiesz::¿ ((gets up))
	oh.dear fish necessitate feed.INF know.2SG
	'oh dear, it is necessary to feed the fish you know'

4	(1.8)/((Ewa walks toward fish tank))
5 Olek	teraz łapki na niebiesko,
	now paws on blue
	'now the paws in blue'
6 Mirek	łapki na niebiesko?
	paws on blue
	'the paws in blue?'
7	(1.6)
8 Mirek	będą ciekawe łapki
	be.FUT.3PL interesting paws
	'they will be interesting paws'
9	(2.0)
10 Ewa	proszę cię ((to the fish))
	ask.1SG you
	'here you are'

At the moment at which the impersonal deontic declarative is produced, none of the co-participants is occupied with the fish. It is fundamentally Ewa's incipient engagement in the task—the fact that she gets up as she formulates the statement—that allows the others to treat the statement as an account of her own observable conduct. And indeed neither Olek nor Marek shows any sign of disruption in their ongoing activities. Still, by using an impersonal deontic declarative, Ewa can present feeding the fish as a collective affair rather than one pertaining only to herself. The turn-final 'you know', which marks the turn as specifically addressed at Olek, gives it a quality beyond an account for Ewa's departure from playing with him, possibly conveying that feeding the fish is a matter that concerns him too.

In this section, we have seen that, when the responsibility for the necessary task cannot be clearly attributed, the speaker's nonverbal behavior at the time of the impersonal deontic declarative can steer the interaction in one of two directions:

- on the one hand, by gazing at another person without making any bid to take on the necessary task, speakers prompt the other person to deal with it, giving the statement the force of a request;
- on the other hand, by beginning to engage in the task without gazing at another person, speakers favor their doing the task alone, giving the statement the force of an account.

4.3. QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE. The qualitative analysis developed in the prior section is supported by quantitative evidence. In order to measure how systematic is the functional relation between the speaker's nonverbal behavior and the action import of an impersonal deontic declarative, we need to operationalize the notions of request and account as two possible outcomes of the interaction.

(13) a. Request = B does X or refuses to do X[5]   63.4% ($n = 85/134$)
      b. Account = only A does X   25.4% ($n = 34/134$)

Table 1 shows the association of request and account outcomes with, on the one hand, A's gaze at B and, on the other hand, A's projectable engagement in doing X.[6]

	A GAZES AT B	A IS PROJECTABLY ENGAGED IN DOING X
REQUEST	61.6% ($n = 45/73$)	13.1% ($n = 11/84$)
ACCOUNT	12.9% ($n = 4/31$)	69.7% ($n = 23/33$)

TABLE 1. A request outcome is associated with A's gaze at B, whereas an account outcome is associated with A's projectable engagement in doing X.

The statistical significance of these associations was tested using mixed-effects logistic regression.[7] This statistic assesses the ability of multiple independent variables (the presence or absence of the two nonverbal behaviors) to predict—positively or negatively—a binary dependent variable (the occurrence of a request or account outcome), while controlling for possible confounding effects, namely the language spoken (Italian or Polish) and the particular recording from which each case is taken. Table 2 summa-

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[5] This encompasses both cases in which B does X alone and cases in which B does X together with A. Refusals account for 11.8% of the cases ($n = 10/85$).

[6] The counts exclude cases where a judgment could not be made because the speaker's body or gaze was not visible in the recording.

[7] The analysis was conducted using the open source statistical environment R (R Core Team 2014), version 3.1.2, and the package lme4 (Bates et al. 2014).

rizes the main results of the analysis, testing the occurrence of a request outcome against an account outcome, as predicted by A's gaze at B and by A's projectable engagement in doing X. Using a request outcome as baseline against which to test the occurrence of an account outcome yields the same coefficients, with opposite polarity.

	EST	SE	z-VALUE	p
(intercept)	1.3162	0.4433	2.969	< 0.01
A gazes at B	1.6092	0.6637	2.425	< 0.05
A is projectably engaged in doing X	−2.6324	0.5846	−4.503	< 0.001

TABLE 2. Fixed effects of mixed-effects logistic regression, showing that a request outcome is positively predicted by A's gaze at B and negatively predicted by A's projectable engagement in doing X.

The results show that both nonverbal behaviors are statistically significant predictors of the outcome, with opposite effects. A's gaze at B while producing the impersonal deontic declarative increases the chances that the necessary task X will be dealt with by B and decreases the chances of A's lone involvement in carrying X out (odds ratio 4.99). The inverse is true for A's projectable engagement in doing X, which predicts positively the occurrence of an account outcome and negatively the occurrence of a request outcome (odds ratio 13.91).

The measures of goodness of fit for the statistical model are 89.3 (AIC) and 102.5 (BIC). The nested random effects reported in Table 3 indicate no significant differences across recordings or between languages.

	VARIANCE	SD
RECORDING	3.361e-14	1.833e-07
LANGUAGE	0.000e+0	0.000e+00

TABLE 3. Random effects of mixed-effects logistic regression.

The overall analysis partially simplifies the range of interactional possibilities created by an impersonal deontic declarative, in that it excludes cases that cannot be straightforwardly categorized as either a request or an account (11.2%, $n = 15/134$). These are mainly cases in which the statement is not responded to and nobody takes on the necessary task (see §5 below), or in which it turns out that the task is already accomplished or underway.[8] These cases are only a minority, however, so the analysis is still representative of the data. Moreover, even if we do include these cases as a third outcome variable in a multinomial logistic regression, its small size and the lack of variability in the distribution of nonverbal behaviors within the group makes it unsuitable as a baseline, introducing error into the model.

In conclusion, this quantitative analysis lends further support to the functional relation between the speaker's nonverbal behavior and the trajectory of interaction generated by an impersonal deontic declarative.

5. AN OPEN RESPONSE SPACE. The picture given by the analysis so far is that of a form implementing one of two actions, as determined by the responsibilities of participants and by the nonverbal behavior of the speaker. But the pragmatics of impersonal deontic

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[8] Also, in a few cases the categorization simplifies the full dynamics of the interaction. Examples 14 and 15 (in §5.1 below), for example, are here treated as having a request outcome, even though the statement simultaneously functions as an account; by contrast, example 19 (in §5.3 below) is treated as having an account outcome, even though the speaker initially creates an opportunity for another person to take on the necessary task. For the purposes of this analysis, what matters is the ultimate outcome of the interaction.

declaratives is more complex than this. In this section, we consider cases in which the interaction generated by the statement cannot be readily categorized as either a request or an account, showing elements of both actions or of neither. This allows us to fully appreciate the multifunctionality of an impersonal deontic declarative form. At the core of the argument is the fact that this form affords an OPEN RESPONSE SPACE and can therefore serve as a point of departure for various interactional trajectories.

5.1. MULTIPLE AGENTS. We begin by considering two cases in which an impersonal deontic declarative functions as both a request and an account. In the fragment in 14, Furio and Sofia have just finished their lunch and are sitting at the kitchen table. Before lunch, in the morning, they went out for groceries, which are still lying in the living room, and also started making biscuits. Now that lunch is over, in line 1 Sofia proposes that they begin shelling walnuts, to continue the biscuits preparation.

(14) BiscottiPome01_2205830 (Italian)

    1 Sofia   dai facciamo noci
                PCL make.1PL walnuts
                    'come on, let's prepare the walnuts'

    2   (3.7)
    3   ((Furio stands up))

4 Furio	sì bisogna portare::: ((moves away from kitchen table))	
	yes necessitate.3SG bring.INF	
	'yes {but first} it is necessary to bring:::'	

    5   (3.5)
    6 Sofia   eh
                ITJ
                    'huh?'

7 Furio	eh bisogna mettere i latticini: ((enters living room))	
	PCL necessitate.3SG put.INF the dairy.products	
	'well, it is necessary to put the dairy products:'	

    8   (0.6)/((Sofia gazes at mozzarellas on the kitchen table))
    9 Sofia   in frigo
                in fridge
                    'in the fridge?'
    10 Furio   sì
                   'yes'
    11   (1.2)/((Furio rummages in grocery bags))
    12 Sofia   ora li   metto
                now 3PL.ACC put.1SG
                   'now I'll put them'

A few seconds after Sofia's proposal (line 1), Furio stands up and begins to produce the target statement. He aligns with the proposal ('yes') but then states that something else is necessary. As it emerges in the following lines, Furio refers to the urgency of putting in the fridge the dairy products they bought in the morning. The first version of Furio's statement (line 4) is uttered after he has stood up and while he moves away from the kitchen table and toward the living room (where the groceries are sitting)—that is, while Furio engages in doing X. One primary function of Furio's statement is therefore to account for his leaving the room and departing from the course of action proposed by Sofia (cf. Goodwin 1987). At the same time, Furio's statement has the effect of getting Sofia involved in putting away the dairy products as well. This emerges a few lines later

(after a repair sequence; lines 10–11) when Sofia registers her engagement in the task: 'now I'll put them' (line 13).

So here an impersonal deontic declarative has a dual action force: it serves to justify the speaker's behavior and, at the same time, to recruit the collaboration of another person. Putting away the groceries is an activity that can be contributed to by more than one person, allowing for multiple participants to get involved. A similar case is given in 15.

Karol is in the kitchen feeding his three-year-old daughter Joanna the last spoonfuls of her dinner.

> (15) PP6-4 19:38 (Polish)
>
>   1 Karol   ostatni kawałek nie uciekaj już
>   last   piece   not flee   already
>   'the last piece, don't turn away now'
>   2   (4.0)/((Joanna eats spoonful))

> | 3 Karol   super trzeba   buzie umyć |
> |---|
> | great necessitate mouth wash.INF |
> | 'great, it is necessary to wash your mouth' |

>   4   (3.2)/((Karol closes dishwasher door))
>   5   ((Karol turns Joanna's stool toward the sink))
>   6   ((Karol and Joanna coordinate washing Joanna's mouth))

Karol's impersonal deontic declarative announces the next relevant step of the activity in which he and Joanna are engaged: washing Joanna's mouth. As he produces it, Karol prepares the ground for the necessary action by moving to the dishwasher and closing the dishwasher door, which obstructs the way to the sink (line 4). Immediately after this, he turns the stool on which Joanna is sitting toward the sink and turns on the water (line 5).

The necessary task here requires the collaboration of both participants. Karol's impersonal deontic declarative accounts for the moves he makes in preparation for the washing (lines 4–5) and for the washing itself, which he performs by rubbing Joanna's face. At the same time, Joanna needs to conduct herself in a way that makes it possible for Karol to wash her face. For example, when Karol turns her stool toward the sink, Joanna does not change her position on the stool so as to be facing the table again but remains seated, now facing the sink. When Karol leans back from the sink to begin the washing, she repositions her body slightly and raises her head to make it easier for him to see and wash her face. The interactional import of the statement is, once again, twofold: it provides Joanna with a reason for what Karol is about to do and at the same time solicits her collaboration in the washing process.

5.2. Agent negotiation. Complex 'it is necessary to X' interactions are not restricted to multiperson tasks. Even with one-person tasks, the statement can make relevant the involvement of different people, leading to a negotiation of ANIMATORSHIP—that is, of the identity of the animator of the task.[9]

In the fragment in 16, Sergio, Greta, and Dino are chatting in a kitchen while Sergio dyes Greta's hair. Before the fragment begins, Greta has asked Sergio to remove a 'thingy' from her forehead. After some initial difficulty understanding what exactly this

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[9] In a compositional notion of human agency, ANIMATOR refers to the social unit (usually an individual) that physically executes an act, to be distinguished from its AUTHOR, the unit that chooses how the act will be articulated, and from its PRINCIPAL, the unit that is accountable for it (see Goffman 1981:Ch. 3, Enfield 2013:Ch. 9; cf. Kockelman 2007).

is, Sergio identifies it as a wisp of hair (line 1) and realizes that it has become stuck because some dye has run down on Greta's forehead. This leads him to state that 'it is necessary also to wipe away the dye from the forehead'.

> (16) Tinta_ 2051380 (Italian)
>   1 Sergio   [questo- ((gets hold of wisp of hair))
>   'this-'
>   2 Greta   [(eh non lo   so)   c'ho   un coso
>   (PCL not 3SG.ACC know.1SG) EXST=have.1SG a   thingy
>   '(well dunno) I've got a thingy'

> 3 Sergio   scusa sì bisogna   pu[lire:: anche la crema dalla
>   sorry yes necessitate.3SG clean.INF also   the cream from.the
>   fronte
>   forehead
>   'sorry yes it is necessary also to wipe away:: the dye from the
>   forehead'

>   4 Dino   [((turns and reaches)) faccio io
>   do.1SG 1SG.N
>   'I'll do it'
>   5 Greta   [((reaches out for paper towel))

The necessary task here could be taken on by any of the three participants, including the speaker. Sergio is the person who is most directly involved in the dyeing process, and who is responsible for having let the dye drip onto Greta's forehead, as displayed by his turn-initial apology 'sorry' (earlier in the interaction, Greta has warned him to make sure her face does not get dirty). While uttering the word *bisogna* 'it is necessary to', Sergio moves his hand in the direction of the table, possibly beginning to reach toward the paper towel, but then hesitates. At the same time, he gazes at Dino, thereby inviting him to get involved. Dino is arguably in a better position to do the wiping than Sergio, because Sergio is wearing gloves that are stained with dye. Also, Dino has already assisted Sergio earlier in the interaction, often seeing to side tasks such as cleaning. So it comes as no surprise that, in response to this situation and to Sergio's gaze, Dino volunteers his help (line 4). But, as he reaches for the paper towel, the third participant, Greta, gets to the paper towel before him and eventually takes on the wiping of her own forehead.[10]

This example shows how an impersonal deontic declarative can make a response relevant for multiple people. When the task is a one-person task, responders may find themselves 'competing' for it, as do Dino and Greta here. This dynamic emerges even more clearly in cases where the designation of the agent becomes a matter of explicit negotiation.

In the fragment in 17, the family are standing around the table and have just said grace. After Ilona and Jacek (the parents) wish everyone an enjoyable meal (lines 1–2), Jacek and the two children move to sit down, while Ilona seems to be surveying the laid table (line 3). Ilona then produces an utterance designed to get Jacek's attention ('eh you know what'; line 4) and launches into an impersonal deontic declarative referring to the need to do something with the juice.

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[10] Dino is also in a good position to wipe away the dye because he can see it on Greta's forehead. At the same time, Greta has a good reason to be the one to do it in that it is her own body.

(17) PP2-4 00:19 (Polish)

    1 Ilona   smacznego
                tasty.GEN
                  'enjoy your meal'

    2 Jacek   smacznego ( )
                tasty.GEN
                  'enjoy your meal ( )'

    3   (1.2)/((Ilona touches gravy jug and napkin holder, then raises left arm))

    4 Ilona   y   wiesz   co   kom[potu¿   (.)
                PCL know.2SG what juice.GEN
                  'eh you know what, juice'

    5   [((reaches right arm across the table for the juice jug))

    6 Ilona   trzeba ((touches jug))
                necessitate
                  'it is necessary'

    7 Jacek   już   [ja   naleję   ]
                already 1SG.NOM PFV.pour.1SG
                  'right now, I'll pour it'

    8   [((Ilona lifts the jug))]

    9 Ilona   [wziąć   ] dob[rze
                     take.INF   good
                      'to take   good'

   10   [((Ilona puts the jug down))

   11 Jacek   [ty   nalejesz¿   ja
                               you PFV.pour.2SG 1SG.NOM
                                  'you'll pour it? I'll'

   12   na[leję
                PFV.pour.1SG
                'pour it'

   13 Ilona   [to   weź   już   to   nalej
                 then take.IMP already then PFV.pour.IMP
                  'then go ahead already, pour then'

   14   (.)/((Jacek takes the jug))

   15 Jacek   będzie   mi   wygodniej   ((picks up jug))
                be.FUT.3SG 1SG.DAT convenient.CMPR
                  'it will be more convenient for me'

   16 Jacek   ((pours juice into everyone's glasses))

As Ilona begins the statement, she reaches across the table toward the juice jug, thus making a bid to take charge of the need she is in the process of formulating (see also the fragments in 11, 12, 14). As Ilona continues the statement and her hand reaches the jug (line 6), Jacek begins a responsive turn about the promptness with which he will carry out the necessary action ('right now'). Immediately after this, while Ilona completes the statement (line 9) and picks up the jug, Jacek adds another component to his turn whereby he volunteers to pour the juice ('I'll pour it'; line 7). Ilona then accepts this offer ('good'; line 9) and puts the jug down (line 10). At the same moment, Jacek has started to retract ('you'll pour it?'; line 11), but in response to Ilona's acceptance he re-

news the offer ('I'll pour it'; line 12). While taking her arm out of Jacek's way, Ilona reconfirms and ratifies her acceptance of Jacek's offer (line 13). Jacek then proceeds to pour the juice, adding an account for taking over this job from Ilona ('it will be more convenient for me'; line 15).

An impersonal deontic declarative does not constrain participation in the necessary task, but leaves it open to any relevant contributor. Even in cases that initially favor the designation of a certain individual, the animatorship can still change. Here, Ilona is projectably engaged in pouring the juice at the time of her statement, an interactional feature that normally leads to the speaker doing X alone. At the same time, however, the turn-initial 'you know what' (line 4) marks her statement as relevant for Jacek, thereby calling for his attention to the necessary act. Also, at the moment Ilona starts her move, Jacek is best positioned to reach the juice. All of these elements appear to stack the odds of who will pour the juice in conflicting ways. The outcome of this complex configuration is that Jacek is recruited to take the accomplishment of the task over from Ilona. So the trajectory of the interaction shifts from an account-like beginning to a request-like outcome.

In the two cases we have just examined, participants compete for the animatorship of the necessary task. The next case illustrates a reverse situation, one in which people dodge becoming involved.

Azio and Remo have just prepared an herbal infusion and are looking for a utensil to use to pour it into mugs. In line 1, Azio notices a soup ladle in the sink, which is immersed in a dirty pot. As Azio gets hold of the ladle and inspects it, Remo states that 'it would be necessary to wash it'.

(18) Camillo_1241239 (Italian)

1 Azio	cè ci sarebbe questo
	PCL EXST be.CND.3SG this
	'well there is this one'
2	(2.4)/((reaches toward soup ladle in the sink))
3 Azio	c'è un po' di pizzoccheri (nel recipiente) però ((grabs ladle))
	EXST=be.3SG a bit of NAME (in.the container) but
	'there's some *pizzoccheri* (in the container) but'

4 Remo	allora bisognerebbe lavarlo
	then necessitate.CND.3SG wash.INF=3SG.ACC
	'then it would be necessary to wash it'

5	(2.6)/((Azio shakes ladle and lifts it out of pot))
6	(0.5)/((Remo walks to kitchen door))
7 Azio	ma vuoi farlo tu ((turns to Remo))
	but want.2SG do.INF=3SG.ACC 2SG.NOM
	'do you want to do it?'
8	(0.3)
9 Remo	come
	how
	'sorry?'
10 Azio	( ) lavarlo (volevi lavarlo)
	wash.INF=3SG.ACC (want.IPF.2SG wash.INF=3SG.ACC)
	'( ) wash- (you wanted to wash it)?'
11 Remo	no no no ( ) perché stavo ( ) perché io ho un
	no no no because stay.IPF.1SG because 1SG.N have.1SG one

> impegno
> commitment
> 'no no no ( ) because I was ( ) because I've got something to do'

As in other cases above, there are arguably no grounds here for one participant being more responsible for the task at hand than the other. One element that may at first glance tilt the balance is that, when the impersonal deontic declarative is produced, Azio is manipulating the ladle. This puts him in a better position to go ahead and wash it. But note that this manipulation follows from his just-prior noticing and is not embedded in any already-established course of action (cf. Leo's handling of the leftovers tray in example 8). Moreover, Remo is standing just beside him (up until line 6), with visibly nothing to do. Such a configuration appears to warrant a negotiation of the task's animatorship. In line 6, Remo walks away from the sink, making a bid to leave Azio in charge, at which point Azio attempts to devolve the washing to him ('do you want to do it?'). Note that the form of this utterance is not that of a request for a favor, which in Italian is typically formatted as a simple interrogative ('will you X for me?') (Rossi 2012, 2015). This suggests that Azio is not asking Remo to take over a task that is his, but rather is bringing into the open the matter of designating an agent. This displays his understanding that the task could equally be done by both.

5.3. Not responding. The range of responding options afforded by an impersonal deontic declarative includes the possibility of not responding. For one thing, this happens in the majority of cases where the statement functions primarily as an account (67.6%, $n = 23/34$), indicating that a statement that justifies the speaker's actions does not require a response (see the fragments in 6, 8, and 12). But it may also happen in other cases where the speaker creates an opportunity for another person to take on the necessary task.

When the fragment in 19 begins, Ada has finished loading the dishwasher, while Eva has just walked to the sink to wash up one last pot left from the dinner. In lines 2–4, Ada announces that the dishwasher is full and turns to the sink to wash her hands. In lines 5–6, while Eva suggests adding more kitchenware into the dishwasher later, Ada turns the hot tap down and the cold tap on. This becomes an issue for Eva as cold water is less effective for washing up.

(19) Capodanno02_42713 (Italian)
```
1          ((Eva turns on hot water))
2 Ada     sto  qua  l'è        piena questa e    quindi  la    fem
          this here scl=be.3sg full  this  and  therefore 3sg.a make.1pl
              partir
              start.inf
             'this is full and so we get it started'
3          (0.8)
4 Ada     ((puts hand under running hot water))
5 Eva     [e    dopo sen      meterà      qualcos' altro
            and then  rfl=prt put.fut.3sg something other
             'and then we'll put something else'
6 Ada     [((turns down hot tap and turns on cold tap))
7          (.)
```
```
8 Eva     [no chi  ghe  vol       roba calda perché  se no  no  se::
           no here exst want.3sg  stuff hot   because if not not rfl
             'no here hot stuff is needed because otherwise it won't::'
```

    9 Ada   [((begins washing her hands))
   10   (6.5)/((Ada continues washing her hands, Eva continues scour-
                ing the pot))
   11 Ada   ((finishes washing hands, turns off both water taps, and moves
                away from sink))
   12 Eva   qua ((turns hot water back on))
                here
                  'here {we go}'
   13   (2.2)
   14 Eva   calda calda calda
                  'hot hot hot'

The central issue here is the concurrence of two courses of action—Eva's washing the pot and Ada's washing her hands—that require water at different temperatures, hot the first, cold the second. At the beginning of the fragment, Eva turns on the hot water (line 1). A few moments later, Ada turns it down and turns on the cold water (line 6). Cold water is more comfortable for washing one's hands, but is less suitable for washing up a greasy pot such as the one Eva is working on. This is the rationale that underlies Eva's impersonal deontic declarative ('no here hot stuff is needed because otherwise it won't::'), which she produces while busy scouring the pot. During the long silence after the statement (line 10), no uptake comes from Ada. She simply continues washing her hands and eventually turns off both water taps (line 11). Had Eva used another strategy to get Ada to turn the hot water up—such as an imperative or an interrogative form—Ada's response would be OFFICIALLY ABSENT here (Schegloff 1968:1083, 2007:20) and would probably be treated as such, for example with a pursuit of response (see Jefferson 1981, Davidson 1984, Pomerantz 1984, Stivers & Rossano 2010, Bolden et al. 2012, Rossano 2012:Ch. 3). This has been shown in prior work on imperative and interrogative forms of requesting (e.g. Ervin-Tripp 1988, Craven & Potter 2010), including our own on Italian and Polish (Rossi 2012, 2015:Chs. 3–4, Zinken & Ogiermann 2013). But this is not what Eva does here. Instead, as Ada moves away from the sink, Eva proceeds to turn the hot tap back on herself (line 12) and continues the washing-up, accompanying this with talk referring to the necessary task ('here we go', 'hot hot hot'). This talk is not a sanction, nor a pursuit of response, but rather works as an 'online commentary' on her actions (Heritage & Stivers 1999).

   Consider another case, given in 20, where people are working in the kitchen. Anna and Gina are washing up some dishes, Piera is preparing a salad, and another two people are busy with other tasks. When the fragment begins, Anna has just agreed with Gina that they will not need to wipe the dishes, but simply to put them on a trolley outside the kitchen to dry off (line 1). She then walks out of the kitchen and, shortly after, comes back to get more clean crockery (line 3). In the following lines, Gina notifies Anna that she will wipe just one particular bowl (line 4) and Anna agrees with her (lines 6–7). Soon after Anna has left the kitchen again (line 7)—and plausibly touched off by the talk about dishes—Piera states that 'it is necessary to also get the dishwasher started guys'.

   (20) CampFamPrep_984945 (Italian)
       1 Anna   metem en zo   e   i   se   suga   da soli lì   ((exits kitchen))
                 put.1PL in down and SCL RFL dry.3PL by alone there
                   'we put them upside down and they'll dry off by themselves
                     there'
       2   (9.5)

3   (4.7)/((Gina enters kitchen to get more clean glasses))
4 Gina   asciugo questo
           dry.1SG this
              'I'll wipe this'
5   (0.9)/((Gina walks to kitchen door))
6 Anna   sì   quel lì   sì   perché m- metem anca via
           yes that there yes because   put.1PL also away
              'yes that one yes because w- we put {it} away'
7   che no serve   ma ((exiting kitchen))
           CON not serve.3SG but
              'since it's no longer needed but'
8   (3.9)

| 9 Piera   bison   (che d') enviar   via   anca la lavatrice   ragazzi |
| necessitate.3SG (CMP of) start.INF away also the dishwasher guys |
| 'it is necessary to also get the dishwasher started guys' |

10   (7.5)
11 Piera   non credevo   de proprio eser   così   stanca
           not believe.IPF.1SG of really   be.INF like.this tired
              'I didn't expect to be so tired'

Piera's statement is not taken up by any of her coparticipants. Gina and two other people simply keep doing their tasks. After a long gap (line 10), Piera does not pursue response but instead launches into a complaint about how she is feeling.

   Note that the statement in line 9 is produced as Piera is busy cutting the salad, looking down on the worktop. At the same time, however, it contains the vocative *ragazzi* 'guys', which addresses it to all those who are present in the kitchen, and so potentially invites them to respond. Despite this, the interaction proceeds without anyone taking on the necessary task. Once again, the statement creates an opportunity for others to act on it, but goes unresponded to, and this is not oriented to as a problem.

   Cases such as those we have just examined are not exceptions. In our data, we can find nine more cases (three Italian, six Polish) like the fragment in 19, where the statement is not responded to and the speaker ends up taking on the necessary task alone, as well as five more cases (three Italian, two Polish) like the fragment in 20, where the statement is not responded to and nobody takes on the necessary task. Together with a majority of account cases in which the statement does not get a response, these cases suggest that impersonal deontic declaratives may not function as canonical first pair parts (Schegloff 1968, Schegloff & Sacks 1973).

   In our data, imperative and interrogative requests are rarely left unresponded to. And when they are, the response is OFFICIALLY ABSENT, in the sense that there are signs that this constitutes a violation of a normative expectation. The grammar of imperatives and interrogatives makes a response structurally projected (Raymond 2003, Rossi 2015:Ch. 3). A declarative and impersonal form, by contrast, affords greater flexibility, in that it does not inherently mandate a specific response of a specific person—in other words, it is low in response mobilization (Stivers & Rossano 2010:27–28). What mobilizes a particular person to act on an impersonal deontic declarative is, for one thing, their responsibility for the necessary task, and, when responsibility is not clear, the speaker's gaze at a particular person, which can increase pressure on them to respond (see §4.2). These factors are not always present, however, and when they are, they are not deterministic but probabilistic. Cases like 14 and 15 suggest that no response is more likely—and re-

sponse potentially less expected—when the speaker does not use any response-mobiliz-
ing features (Stivers & Rossano 2010) or uses a feature that does not select a single ad-
dressee, such as the plural vocative *ragazzi* 'guys'.

So the extent to which an impersonal deontic declarative can be left unresponded to
depends on the interactional configuration in which it is produced, including its multi-
modal design and the relative responsibilities of participants. This generates a number
of cases in which the absence of an uptake is not problematic and can simply be let
through as a missed opportunity to take on a job.

To conclude, the cases presented in this whole section (§5) show that impersonal de-
ontic declaratives are points of departure for a range of different trajectories. These go
beyond a simple opposition between requests and accounts, encompassing cases in
which participation in the necessary task is shared, negotiated, or avoided. Impersonal
deontic declaratives, in other words, afford an open response space.

6. Discussion. In this article, we have examined the use of impersonal deontic de-
claratives like Italian *bisogna X* and Polish *trzeba X* 'it is necessary to X'. These belong
to a family of forms that assert the existence of an obligation or necessity without tying
it to any particular individual. Such statements have the potential to both mobilize or le-
gitimize the accomplishment of an act, and can therefore fulfill different pragmatic
functions or actions. Our goal has been to explain how these actions come into effect as
a result of the synergy between the grammar of an impersonal deontic declarative, the
environments in which it is deployed, and the nonverbal conduct that accompanies it.

Impersonal deontic declaratives often appear to realize one of two alternative ac-
tions: a request—prompting another person to do something—or an account—ra-
tionalizing what the speaker herself is about to do. These actions are easily ascribed
when the speaker or another person is understood to be responsible for the necessary
task. When responsibility cannot be clearly attributed, the speaker's nonverbal behavior
at the time of the statement becomes crucial in steering the interaction in one or the
other direction. By gazing at another person without making any bid to take on the nec-
essary task, the speaker increases the chances that the other will do it. By contrast, the
speaker's incipient engagement in the task and the absence of gaze at other people favor
the speaker's doing the task alone.

These findings extend prior research on the interplay between language and visible
bodily conduct (de Jorio 1832, Goffman 1963, Clark 1996, Goodwin 2000, McNeill
2000, Kendon 2004, Enfield 2009, among many others). Focusing on the pragmatics of
a specific lexico-grammatical type, we demonstrate how action formation and ascrip-
tion is systematically shaped by specific kinds of nonverbal behaviors. This contributes
to our understanding of action formation (Schegloff 2007:xiv, Levinson 2013) as a mul-
timodal and compositional process, enhancing prior findings on the response-mobiliz-
ing function of gaze (Kendon 1967, Bavelas et al. 2002, Kidwell 2009, Stivers &
Rossano 2010, Rossano 2012:Ch. 3) and bringing to the fore the role of behaviors that
involve the whole body (cf. Kendon 1990, Streeck et al. 2011, Broth & Mondada 2013,
Mondada 2013).

The grammar of an impersonal deontic declarative is compatible with different inter-
actional possibilities. From a compositional point of view, then, grammar is a first layer
of action with a certain 'illocutionary potential' (Alston 1994, Sadock 2006:62, 71),
which is actualized in combination with other semiotic layers (see Goodwin 2000, En-
field 2009, among others). This potential, however, goes beyond a simple opposition be-
tween requests and accounts. While people's relative responsibilities and the speaker's
nonverbal conduct systematically influence its function, an impersonal deontic declara-

tive can still generate more complex interactions. It can function simultaneously as both a request and an account (fragments in 14 and 15), function as a request for multiple people (fragment 16), give rise to a negotiation of who will do the task (fragments 17 and 18), or simply go unresponded to (fragments 19 and 20). This versatility derives from the grammatical makeup of the statement: while its deontic meaning makes relevant the doing of a task, its impersonality does not constrain participation in the task, and its declarative form affords an open response space (cf. Vinkhuyzen & Szymanski 2005). These features give impersonal deontic declaratives a particular status in the grammatical system of Italian and Polish, placing them in opposition to forms that restrict the response space to one or two alternatives (imperatives and interrogatives) and/or that restrict the animatorship of an act to a single individual (e.g. *I/you need to X*). We expect these distinctions to be relevant across other languages that provide similar formal alternatives.

Impersonal deontic declaratives are a special tool for the management of social agency. While their use may seem equivocal at first glance, it is better characterized as usefully—if not designedly—ambiguous. The point of an impersonal deontic declarative is to present an act as the right thing to do for anyone in the current situation. The identity of the animator is in principle open and will emerge as product of the synergy between grammar, people's responsibilities, the speaker's nonverbal conduct, and the contingencies of the situation.

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