Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices

Gottesman, D; Lo, HK; Lutkenhaus, N; Preskill, J

アイテム詳細

登録内容を編集ファイル形式で保存

一時保存へ追加

タグ情報を表示リリース履歴を表示詳細要約

公開

学術論文

Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons201118

Lutkenhaus, N
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

There are no locators available

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

フルテキスト (公開)

公開されているフルテキストはありません

付随資料 (公開)

There is no public supplementary material available

引用

Gottesman, D., Lo, H., Lutkenhaus, N., & Preskill, J. (2004). Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices. QUANTUM INFORMATION & COMPUTATION, 4(5), 325-360.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-6DE2-1

要旨

We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.