Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution 
protocol with weak coherent pulses

Curty, M; Lutkenhaus, N

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.71.062301

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Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses

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Lutkenhaus, N
Max Planck Research Group, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Curty, M., & Lutkenhaus, N. (2005). Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses. PHYSICAL REVIEW A, 71(6): 062301. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.71.062301.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-6DCC-6

Abstract

Unconditional security proofs of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of quantum key distribution have been obtained recently. These proofs cover also practical implementations that utilize weak coherent pulses in the four signal polarizations. Proven secure rates leave open the possibility that new proofs or new public discussion protocols will obtain larger rates over increased distance. In this paper we investigate limits to the error rate and signal losses that can be tolerated by future protocols and proofs.