happened during the year related to where APA is, where it is going, what is coming down the road, and what challenges and opportunities are ahead. Are there no big-picture issues, themes that bind, higher hopes, or questions that challenge, or are there only small, discrete actions as the new millennium approaches? Is this the end of psychology?

The only purpose that appears to drive APA is more—more building space because of more members and more staff. Several decades ago, it was quipped that given the rate at which APA was gaining membership, every person in the United States would be a member of APA by the turn of the century. Now APA seems to believe that simple extrapolation from the present is a responsible way of managing the future.

More pervades APA’s budget. APA continues products, services, and programs by adding an inflation factor to the budget and begins new ones by adding their cost to the budget. This is sheltered management. The challenge is to do more output with less input. Where is economy in management, which releases the best in creativity, innovation, and ideas? APA has no stretch goals to create efficiencies and take a bite out of product, service, and program costs. And it shows. The red flag is down—while APA is growing, its net worth remains stationary (Koocher, August 1996).

DeLeon (August 1996) described an outstanding management team. But APA’s members are far more distant from this management team and its values than from teams and values in companies in which members may own stocks. As one example, in the annual reports of General Electric, one can read about its management’s guiding values and about how those who make the bottom line but who do not live the values—who threaten, bully, suppress, and “kiss up, kick down”—are shown the exit. Accountability requires that APA’s members know APA’s management team not only by what it does but also by how it does it.

A new Association Rule serves as a case study of how the management team’s unresponsiveness makes more bureaucracy. Two years ago, the Council of Representatives—APA’s supreme legislative body whose decisions affect the future direction of psychology—adopted a rule requesting that agenda items in their final form be provided to the Council (read customers) and to the first rule. Resolution should have happened at the informal stage by using management tools such as performance appraisal. Every action of the management team should contribute to busting, not fueling, bureaucracy. (Perhaps rules spawned by management’s unresponsiveness should be named after the offender!)

A deeper echo from this case is the indifferent attitude of the management toward the Council and its work. Consider the hoops the Council had to go through simply, and I repeat simply, to get in a timely manner the basic information it needs to make the best decisions it can. Meeting that need would seem to be an administrative no-brainer.

Organized psychology claims the banner of the scientist–practitioner model; uses the phrase “scientific research results show that . . .” to catch the ear of members of Congress; has rules requiring that public policy positions should be backed by scientific data; and has a dedicated cadre of volunteers to review, massage, and deliberate on policy direction. Yet, the Council of Representatives passed the resolution on prescription privilege that undifferentiates psychology in the marketplace—a crossroad—without walking its talk. Organized psychology must live its values and its structures; otherwise its center is lost.

Finally, I was thunderstruck to read that 8.4% of the 1995 budget went to consultants. Corporations, from large to small, typically allocate no more than 1% of their budget to consultants. The membership deserves a detailed accounting of that $5 million. APA’s top leadership is paid a substantially higher salary than the CEO of a Fortune 500 company. APA’s members should expect some equivalence in the allocation of their resources.

REFERENCES


Joann Horai is an independent management consultant and a member of the American Psychological Association. Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Joann Horai, 4849 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to jhorai@aol.com.

Is Deception Acceptable?

Andreas Ortmann
Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Munich, and Bowdoin College

Ralph Hertwig
Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Munich

On September 18, 1996, The International Herald Tribune reported the following:

A new study shows that when white Southerners feel they have been insulted, their stress and aggression-related hormones surge, while those of Northerners change little. Two University of Michigan psychologists lured a variety of students to a laboratory, ostensibly to test their reactions to a questionaire at the far end of a narrow hallway and had to squeeze by a student working at a file drawer. When they returned, the student slammed the door shut, bumped the subject and called him an insulting name. Southern subjects tested immediately afterward showed a 12 percent increase in testosterone levels and 79 percent rise in cortisol, a stress hormone; among Northerners, the changes were not significant. (“The Bellicose Southern Male,” p. 3)

In using deception, the investigators in this study (Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen) were in good company. In a recent comment, Taylor and Shepperd (August 1996) reminded us of Adair, Dushenko, and Lindsay’s (1985) finding, also in the American Psychologist, that “upwards of 81% of studies published in the top social psychological journals use deception in their procedures” (as cited in Taylor & Shepperd, 1996, p. 886). Taylor and Shepperd then described an experiment in which they used deception to study the effectiveness of conventional debriefing procedures for detecting suspicion of deception among research participants. Notwithstanding the explicit instructions of the experimenter not to communicate while he or she left the room on a pretext, they found that participants did communicate with each other. By doing so, participants found out that deception was involved in the experiment—a discovery that they did not reveal during debriefing. Taylor and Shepperd (1996) concluded that our observation suggests that participants may fail to supply, and may even withhold, information that is crucial to evaluating whether the procedures provide a valid test of the hypothesis. If participants cannot be counted
on to divulge such information on their own, then researchers need to take additional precautions to assess participant suspicions and perceptions. (p. 887)

We believe that it is time to go beyond cosmetic refinements of experimental procedures and address the fundamental question of whether deception should be an acceptable option at all. We propose it should not be.

Experiments in psychological research typically conceptualize participants as cooperative (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). In addition, researchers assume that participants think of experimenters as living up to the cooperation principle that requires them to provide useful and truthful information (Hilton, 1995). To the extent that participants have reason to believe that they will be deceived—a blatant violation of the cooperation principle—they are likely to turn noncooperative. The strategic interaction between experimenters and participants has, after all, the incentive structure of prisoners' dilemma games. Participants can choose not to cooperate, and so can experimenters. Theoretically and experimentally, we know that in repeated prisoners' dilemma games, persistent noncooperation of identifiable defectors is likely to lead to the unraveling of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in which both the experimenter and participant choose the cooperative action (see Frank, 1988; Ortmann & Colander, 1997).

The purpose of this comment is not to single out specific studies. We are concerned about how deception compromises the reputation of all psychological experimenters among potential participants. Sensational media reports and publications inside and outside of psychology are all potential sources of information about standard procedures in psychology for future participants and might create and reinforce participants' expectation that they will be deceived. Psychological laboratories are likely to be affected by reputational spillover effects as a consequence. Such effects could transform every interaction between an experimenter and a participant into a repeated game.

Let us recall the ethical standards regarding deception established by the American Psychological Association:

Methodological requirements of a study may make the use of concealment or deception necessary. Before conducting such a study, the investigator has a special responsibility to (1) determine whether the use of such techniques is justified by the study's prospective scientific, educational, or applied value; (2) determine whether alternative procedures are available that do not involve concealment or deception; and (3) ensure that the participants are provided with sufficient explanation as soon as possible. (as cited in Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pp. 240–241)

These guidelines make it clear that investigators should undertake a thorough cost–benefit analysis before using deception. Although this policy prescription is fine theoretically, as a practical matter it leaves the assessment of (private) benefits and (public) costs to an interested party (the experimenter) — a classic moral hazard problem.

Economic agency theory as well as the psychological theory of self-serving biases predict a breakdown in self-monitoring in this case. Indeed, given the overwhelming use of deception in psychology experiments and its dramatic increase since the early 1960s (Adair et al., 1985, reported that only 16% of the empirical studies in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology used deception in 1961), we conclude that self-monitoring with regard to the costs and benefits of deception has broken down, despite exhortations to "use it [deception] only when clearly justified, not as a matter of course" (Kelman, 1967, p. 1).

We believe that the dramatic increase in the use of deception may invalidate the claim that deception is ever defensible. Put simply, the costs of reputational spillover effects for the profession may be too high. (Ironically, the well-intentioned Guideline 3 may have contributed to the problem.) Elsewhere, we argue (Hertwig & Ortmann, 1997) that the breakdown in self-monitoring may contribute critically to the high variability and frequent nonreplicability of research results and ultimately affect the reputation of the profession.

Our proposition that the profession ought to consider outlawing all forms of deception is not as radical as it may sound. In experimental economics, for example, professional conventions categorically prohibit deception for exactly the reputational reasons laid out above. As cognitive, evolutionary, and social psychology ventures more and more into domains formerly inhabited solely by economists, reevaluating the use of deception in psychological research becomes ever more important.

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Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Andreas Ortmann, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Leopoldstrasse 24, 80802 Munich, Germany. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to aortmann@polar.bowdoin.edu.