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Journal Article

On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents–A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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Güth,  Werner
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Avrahami, J., Güth, W., Kareev, Y., & Uske, T. (2017). On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents–A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. German Economic Review, 18(1), 81-98.


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