Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak 
Interests in Financial Reforms

Kastner, Lisa

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Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms

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Kastner, Lisa
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo), MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Kastner, L. (2016). Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms. PhD Thesis, Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris, Paris.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-134F-9

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