The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

Kalinowski, Martin B.; Becker, Andreas; Saey, Paul R. J.; Tuma, Matthias P.; Wotawa, Gerhard

doi:10.1002/cplx.20228

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The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

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Becker, Andreas
AG Müller, Marianne, Florian Holsboer (Direktor), Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Max Planck Society;

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Kalinowski, M. B., Becker, A., Saey, P. R. J., Tuma, M. P., & Wotawa, G. (2008). The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example. SI, 14(1), 89-99. doi:10.1002/cplx.20228.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0018-14E9-E

Abstract

Verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a complex undertaking. A monitoring system comprising a global network of 321 seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations is used to detect signals that could indicate a possible nuclear explosion. This system daily sends more than 10 GB of raw data to the Vienna based International Data Centre for further processing and analysis to answer a simple question: have any indications for a possible nuclear explosion been sensed? We will focus on the 40 stations in charge for global radioxenon monitoring and discuss the complexity of solving the nuclear source attribution problem. (C) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.