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The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

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http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons128422

Peña,  Jorge
Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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Nöldeke, G., & Peña, J. (2016). The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information. Games and economic behavior, 99, 71-81. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-1F9A-3
Abstract
Abstract We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.