Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods 
dilemma

Du, Jimming; Wu, Bin; Wang, Long

doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2016.02.039

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Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma

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Wu, Bin
Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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引用

Du, J., Wu, B., & Wang, L. (2016). Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma. Physics Letters. A, 380(16), 1432-1436. doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2016.02.039.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-1174-3

要旨

How to exploit public non-renewable resources is a public goods dilemma. Individuals can choose to limit the depletion in order to use the resource for a longer time or consume more goods to benefit themselves. When the resource is used up, there is no benefit for the future generations any more, thus the evolutionary process ends. Here we investigate what mechanisms can extend the use of resources in the framework of evolutionary game theory under two updating rules based on imitation and aspiration, respectively. Compared with imitation process, aspiration dynamics may prolong the sustainable time of a public resource.