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Journal Article

Bidding in hierarchies

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Citation

Konrad, K. A. (2004). Bidding in hierarchies. European economic review, 48(6), 1301-1308. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.12.010.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0023-DB56-7
Abstract
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.