de.mpg.escidoc.pubman.appbase.FacesBean
English
 
Help Guide Disclaimer Contact us Login
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Journal Article

Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games

MPS-Authors
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons57014

Wu,  Bin
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons61185

García,  Julián
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons56973

Traulsen,  Arne
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

Locator
There are no locators available
Fulltext (public)

Wu_2013.pdf
(Publisher version), 832KB

Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Wu, B., García, J., Hauert, C., & Traulsen, A. (2013). Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games. PLoS Computational Biology, 9(12): e1003381. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0014-C5D7-8
Abstract
In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By ‘‘qualitatively valid’’ we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies n. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for n§8, which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.