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Conference Paper

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

MPS-Authors
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons44338

Doerr,  Benjamin
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons45543

van Stee,  Rob
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons45750

Winzen,  Carola
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Chen, X., Doerr, B., Hu, X., Ma, W., van Stee, R., & Winzen, C. (2012). The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two. In P. W. Goldberg (Ed.), Internet and Network Economics (pp. 420-433). Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_31.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0014-BBEE-7
Abstract
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.