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Journal Article

Information Acquisition in Conflicts

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http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons51228

Morath,  Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Morath, F., & Münster, J. (2013). Information Acquisition in Conflicts. Economic Theory, 54(1), 99-129.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-A0A9-C
Abstract
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two playerswith one-sided asymmetric informationwhere one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use our results to study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. If the decision to acquire information is observable, but not the information received, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, the cut-off values of the cost of information that determine equilibrium information acquisition are higher than those in the first best. Thus, information acquisition is excessive. In contrast,with open or covert information acquisition, the equilibrium cut-off values are as in the first best.