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Reputation is valuable within and outside one's own social group

MPG-Autoren
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons56933

Semmann,  Dirk
Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons56779

Krambeck,  Hans-Jürgen
Department Ecophysiology, Max Planck Institute for Limnology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons56825

Milinski,  Manfred
Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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Zitation

Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2005). Reputation is valuable within and outside one's own social group. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 57(6), 611-616. doi:10.1007/s00265-004-0885-3.


Zitierlink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D9D1-F
Zusammenfassung
To find conditions under which humans cooperate within Groups Of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within one's own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside one's own social group can be a driving, force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.