de.mpg.escidoc.pubman.appbase.FacesBean
English
 
Help Guide Disclaimer Contact us Login
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Journal Article

Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity

MPS-Authors
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/cone/persons/resource/persons56973

Traulsen,  Arne
Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

Locator
There are no locators available
Fulltext (public)

Traulsen_BMB_2008.pdf
(Publisher version), 234KB

Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Traulsen, A., Shoresh, N., & Nowak, M. A. (2008). Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 70(5), 1410-1424. doi:10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D68C-7
Abstract
The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (=fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (=multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.