Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy

Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel P.

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Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy

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Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Konrad, K. A., & Thum, M. P. (2011). Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy. WZB Discussion Paper, SP II, 2011-109.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-47E8-6

Abstract

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.