Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup 
Conflict

Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Zur Ablage hinzufügen

Lokale TagsFreigabegeschichteDetailsÜbersicht

Freigegeben

Forschungspapier

Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict

MPG-Autoren

/persons/resource/persons51208

Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons51228

Morath, Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881550
(Preprint)

Volltexte (beschränkter Zugriff)

Für Ihren IP-Bereich sind aktuell keine Volltexte freigegeben.

Volltexte (frei zugänglich)

Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte in PuRe verfügbar

Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)

Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar

Zitation

Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2011). Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-07.

Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-47C3-7

Zusammenfassung

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.