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Journal Article

Computing Equilibria for a Service Provider Game with (Im)perfect Information

MPS-Authors
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Beier,  René
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

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Czumaj,  Artur
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

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Krysta,  Piotr
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons45673

Vöcking,  Berthold
Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Beier, R., Czumaj, A., Krysta, P., & Vöcking, B. (2006). Computing Equilibria for a Service Provider Game with (Im)perfect Information. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2, 679-706.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-225D-C
Abstract
We study fundamental algorithmic questions concerning the complexity of market equilibria under perfect and imperfect information by means of a basic microeconomic game. Suppose a provider offers a service to a set of potential customers. Each customer has a particular demand of service and her behavior is determined by a utility function that is nonincreasing in the sum of demands that are served by the provider. Classical game theory assumes complete information: the provider has full knowledge of the behavior of all customers. We present a complete characterization of the complexity of computing optimal pricing strategies and of computing best/worst equilibria in this model. Basically, we show that most of these problems are inapproximable in theworst case but admit an FPASin the average case. Our average case analysis covers large classes of distributions for customer utilities. We generalize our analysis to robust equilibria in which players change their strategies only when this promises a significant utility improvement.