Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT
  Something Left to Lose? Network Preservation as a Motive for Protectionist Responses to Foreign Takeovers

Callaghan, H. (2015). Something Left to Lose? Network Preservation as a Motive for Protectionist Responses to Foreign Takeovers. Review of International Political Economy, 22(2), 391-418. doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.893246.

Item is

Basisdaten

einblenden: ausblenden:
Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

Dateien

einblenden: Dateien
ausblenden: Dateien
:
mpifg_zs14_2703.pdf (Verlagsversion), 274KB
 
Datei-Permalink:
-
Name:
mpifg_zs14_2703.pdf
Beschreibung:
Full text
OA-Status:
Sichtbarkeit:
Eingeschränkt (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, MKGS; )
MIME-Typ / Prüfsumme:
application/pdf
Technische Metadaten:
Copyright Datum:
-
Copyright Info:
-
Lizenz:
-

Externe Referenzen

einblenden:
ausblenden:
externe Referenz:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.893246 (Verlagsversion)
Beschreibung:
Full text via publisher
OA-Status:

Urheber

einblenden:
ausblenden:
 Urheber:
Callaghan, Helen1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Institutioneller Wandel im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214549              

Inhalt

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Schlagwörter: economic patriotism, international trade, globalization, cross-border mergers, corporate governance, Britain, France, Varieties of Capitalism, capitalist development
 Zusammenfassung: International market integration reduces the overlap between economic and political borders, but what, exactly, does that imply? According to some rational choice accounts, it means that globalization will eventually undermine itself by triggering protectionist backlashes. Previous scholarship has highlighted flaws in the underlying assumption that elected politicians prioritize local stakeholders over anonymous shareholders. The present article adds that, regarding foreign takeovers, levels of protectionism would vary even if governments did prioritize local stakeholders, because stakeholder preferences vary across corporate governance regimes. Where, as in the UK, coordination relies more on market mechanisms than on networks, foreign acquisitions are less disruptive, and political mobilization against them is weaker. To the extent that the internationalization of corporate ownership spreads outsider governance by destroying networks, resistance therefore declines as the market expands. Quantitative correlational evidence is supplemented by case studies of bids for three British companies that provoked unusual levels of political mobilization.

Details

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2014-03-272015
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: Expertenbegutachtung
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2014.893246
 Art des Abschluß: -

Veranstaltung

einblenden:

Entscheidung

einblenden:

Projektinformation

einblenden:

Quelle 1

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Titel: Review of International Political Economy
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 22 (2) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 391 - 418 Identifikator: ISSN: 0969-2290
ISSN: 1466-4526