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  Computing Equilibria in Markets with Budget-Additive Utilities

Bei, X., Garg, J., Hoefer, M., & Mehlhorn, K. (2016). Computing Equilibria in Markets with Budget-Additive Utilities. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07210.

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arXiv:1603.07210.pdf (Preprint), 603KB
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 Urheber:
Bei, Xiaohui1, Autor           
Garg, Jugal1, Autor           
Hoefer, Martin1, Autor           
Mehlhorn, Kurt1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society, ou_24019              

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Schlagwörter: Computer Science, Computer Science and Game Theory, cs.GT,Computer Science, Data Structures and Algorithms, cs.DS
 Zusammenfassung: We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization problems. They extend the standard case of linear utilities and have been studied in a variety of other market models. In contrast to the frequently studied CES utilities, they have a global satiation point which can imply multiple market equilibria with quite different characteristics. Our main result is an efficient combinatorial algorithm to compute a market equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods. It relies on a new descending-price approach and, as a special case, also implies a novel combinatorial algorithm for computing a market equilibrium in linear Fisher markets. We complement these positive results with a number of hardness results for related computational questions. We prove that it is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, and it is PPAD-hard to find any market equilibrium with utility functions with separate satiation points for each buyer and each good.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2016-03-232016-04-302016
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: 21 pages
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 Identifikatoren: arXiv: 1603.07210
URI: http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07210
BibTex Citekey: BeiGargHoeferMehlhorn2016
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