Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT
  Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

Christodoulou, G., Mehlhorn, K., & Pyrga, E. (2013). Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.2877.

Item is

Dateien

einblenden: Dateien
ausblenden: Dateien
:
1202.2877.pdf (Preprint), 166KB
Name:
1202.2877.pdf
Beschreibung:
File downloaded from arXiv at 2015-01-28 09:25
OA-Status:
Sichtbarkeit:
Öffentlich
MIME-Typ / Prüfsumme:
application/pdf / [MD5]
Technische Metadaten:
Copyright Datum:
-
Copyright Info:
-

Externe Referenzen

einblenden:

Urheber

einblenden:
ausblenden:
 Urheber:
Christodoulou, George1, Autor           
Mehlhorn, Kurt1, Autor           
Pyrga, Evangelia1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Algorithms and Complexity, MPI for Informatics, Max Planck Society, ou_24019              

Inhalt

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Schlagwörter: Computer Science, Computer Science and Game Theory, cs.GT
 Zusammenfassung: We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms. We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if $\ell_e(x)$ is the latency function of an edge $e$, we replace it by $\hat{\ell}_e(x)$ with $\ell_e(x) \le \hat{\ell}_e(x)$ for all $x$. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, if $\CM(r)$ denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate $r$ and $\Copt(r)$ denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate then [\ePoA = \max_{r \ge 0} \frac{\CM(r)}{\Copt(r)}.] We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.

Details

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2012-02-132013-01-082013-01-08
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: 17 pages, 2 figures, preliminary version appeared at ESA 2011
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: arXiv: 1202.2877
URI: http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.2877
BibTex Citekey: Kurtprice2013
 Art des Abschluß: -

Veranstaltung

einblenden:

Entscheidung

einblenden:

Projektinformation

einblenden:

Quelle

einblenden: