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  Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game

Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2012). Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game. Economics Letters, 117(3), 589-591.

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 Creators:
Tan, Fangfang1, Author           
Xiao, Erte2, Author
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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Free keywords: Social dilemmas, Third party punishment, Cooperation, Experiment
 Abstract: In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2012
 Publication Status: Issued
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 Rev. Type: -
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Title: Economics Letters
  Abbreviation : Econ. Lett.
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: Amsterdam : North-Holland
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 117 (3) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 589 - 591 Identifier: ISSN: 0165-1765
ZDB: 717210-2
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954925481602