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  Preference for Randomization: Empirical and Experimental Evidence

Dwenger, N., Kübler, D., & Weizsäcker, G. (2012). Preference for Randomization: Empirical and Experimental Evidence. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2012-14.

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192422 (Any fulltext)
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 Creators:
Dwenger, Nadja1, Author           
Kübler , Dorothea2, Author
Weizsäcker , Georg2, Author
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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Free keywords: Stochastic dominance violations, individual decision making, university choice, matching
 Abstract: We investigate violations of consequentialism in the form of the stochastic dominance property. The property is shared by many theories of choice and implies that the decision-maker prefers receiving the best outcome for sure over all lotteries that involve multiple outcomes. We run experiments to demonstrate that dominated randomization can be attractive. In treatments where decision-makers are asked to submit multiple decisions without knowing which one is relevant, many participants submit contradictory sets of decisions and thereby induce a dominated lottery between outcomes. Explicit choice of non-consequentialist randomization is observed in a separate treatment. A possible reason for the effect is the desire to avoid having to make the decision. A large data set on (high-stake) university applications in Germany shows patterns that are consistent with a preference for randomization.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2012-12-21
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 32
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Title: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Source Genre: Series
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: No. 2012-14 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -