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  Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games

Traulsen, A., Hauert, C., De Silva, H., Nowak, M. H., & Sigmund, K. (2009). Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games. Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America, 106(3), 709-712. doi:10.1073/pnas.0808450106.

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Traulsen_PNAS_2009.pdf (Verlagsversion), 430KB
 
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 Urheber:
Traulsen, Arne1, 2, Autor           
Hauert, Christoph, Autor
De Silva, Hannelore, Autor
Nowak, Martin H., Autor
Sigmund, Karl, Autor
Affiliations:
1Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              
2Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Schlagwörter: cooperation; costly punishment; finite populatons; mutation rates
 Zusammenfassung: Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the available set of strategies has received less attention so far. In genetic settings, the latter corresponds to mutations in the DNA, whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals experimenting with new behaviors. Genetic mutations typically occur with very small probabilities, but random exploration of available strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this phenomenon “exploration dynamics” to contrast it with the traditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the emerging evolutionary dynamics, we consider a public goods game with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods games. This phenomenon is investigated through numerical simulations and analytical approximations.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2009-01-20
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
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 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: eDoc: 403378
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0808450106
Anderer: 2677/S 38974
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Titel: Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America
  Alternativer Titel : PNAS
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 106 (3) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 709 - 712 Identifikator: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)