Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT
  Human strategy updating in evolutionary games

Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010). Human strategy updating in evolutionary games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(7), 2962-2966. doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107.

Item is

Dateien

einblenden: Dateien
ausblenden: Dateien
:
Traulsen_2010.pdf (Verlagsversion), 248KB
 
Datei-Permalink:
-
Name:
Traulsen_2010.pdf
Beschreibung:
-
OA-Status:
Sichtbarkeit:
Eingeschränkt (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, MPLM; )
MIME-Typ / Prüfsumme:
application/pdf
Technische Metadaten:
Copyright Datum:
-
Copyright Info:
-
Lizenz:
-

Externe Referenzen

einblenden:

Urheber

einblenden:
ausblenden:
 Urheber:
Traulsen, Arne1, Autor           
Semmann, Dirk2, Autor           
Sommerfeld, Ralf D.2, Autor           
Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen3, Autor           
Milinski, Manfred2, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              
2Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              
3Department Ecophysiology, Max Planck Institute for Limnology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_976547              

Inhalt

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Schlagwörter: update mechanisms; cooperation; finite populations; structured populations
 Zusammenfassung: Evolutionary game dynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in theoretical models and, for example, can significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. What kind of strategy update rules can describe imitation dynamics in humans? Here, we present a way to measure such strategy update rules in a behavioral experiment. We use a setting in which individuals are virtually arranged on a spatial lattice. This produces a large number of different strategic situations from which we can assess strategy updating. Most importantly, spontaneous strategy changes corresponding to mutations or exploration behavior are more frequent than assumed in many models. Our experimental approach to measure properties of the update mechanisms used in theoretical models will be useful for mathematical models of cultural evolution.

Details

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2010-02-16
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: eDoc: 474672
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107
Anderer: 2746/S 39076
 Art des Abschluß: -

Veranstaltung

einblenden:

Entscheidung

einblenden:

Projektinformation

einblenden:

Quelle 1

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Titel: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Alternativer Titel : PNAS
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 107 (7) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 2962 - 2966 Identifikator: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)