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  Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?

Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2014). Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2014-05.

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資料種別: 成果報告書

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 作成者:
Tan, Fangfang1, 著者           
Xiao, Erte2, 著者
所属:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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キーワード: third-party punishment, group decision making, retribution, deterrence, social dilemmas, experiment
 要旨: We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with third party punishment, we find groups punish more when the penalty embeds deterrence than when it can only be retributive. In contrast, individual third parties’ punishment decisions do not vary on whether the punishment has any deterrent effect. In general, third party groups are less likely to impose punishment than individuals even though the punishment is costless for third parties.

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言語: eng - English
 日付: 2014-04-16
 出版の状態: オンラインで出版済み
 ページ: 42
 出版情報: -
 目次: -
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 識別子(DOI, ISBNなど): -
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出版物 1

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出版物名: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
種別: 連載記事
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ページ: - 巻号: No. 2014-05 通巻号: - 開始・終了ページ: - 識別子(ISBN, ISSN, DOIなど): -